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A B S T R A C T
Recent decades have witnessed a growing scholarly interest in women’s involvement in ASM, with many authors
drawing attention to two frequently occurring trends: the fact that women move to mining areas to escape
oppressive gender rules and norms, and the remarkable eﬀorts of women miners to exercise agency in the
typically complex and unstable socio-political environments of artisanal mining sites. An important gap in the
existing literature is the lack of attention for the diﬀerences in agency and the power relations between these
women. This article seeks to fill this gap by presenting an ethnographic case study on the so-called mamans
moutrousses, a group of women assisting artisanal miners with the drying and cleaning of minerals in coltan
mines close to Kisengo, a locality situated in the Congolese Tanganyika province. Drawing inspiration from
Vigh’s navigation theory, the work of Honwana, and the spatial approach advanced by Watts and Korf, the
article argues that the less successful women in Kisengo’s mining business have only been able to display ‘tactic
agency’, while the more successful ones have succeeded in demonstrating ‘strategic agency’.
1. Introduction
After decades of neglect, women miners finally appear to receive the
scholarly attention they deserve. There is by now a substantial body of
literature documenting and analyzing the large variety of roles, posi-
tions, experiences and perspectives of women taking part in diﬀerent
forms of mining across the globe and in diﬀerent phases of human
history (Lahiri-Dutt and Macintyre, 2006; Gier and Mercier, 2006).
There are studies about the personal motives for and the structural
causes of female participation in mining and mining-related activities
(Yakovleva, 2007; Maclin et al., 2017), the many diﬃculties, barriers,
and forms of discrimination, oppression and inequality women miners
are confronted with (Armah et al., 2016; Hilson et al., 2018b), and the
remarkable resilience, inventiveness and creativity of women living and
working in mining areas (Kelly et al., 2014; Werthmann, 2009). Fur-
thermore, recent years have witnessed growing attention to the dis-
turbingly high levels of sexual and gender-based violence in mining
settings (Rustad et al., 2016; Kotsadam et al., 2017), and to the fact that
women sometimes play a leading role in expressing the grievances and
defending the interests of indigenous communities vis-à-vis large-scale
mining corporations (Jenkins, 2015).
In the literature on artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), the
complexity and gendered nature of power relations in mining camps
and boomtowns has been highlighted by several scholars. The research
of Geenen (2016) in the gold mines of Congo’s South Kivu province,
though not specifically focused on gender issues, has shown that, con-
trary to the widespread popular image of artisanal mining areas as
places of lawlessness, chaos, criminality, alcohol and drug abuse, the
artisanal mining sector is usually surprisingly well organized and gov-
erned by a combination of oﬃcial and unoﬃcial rules, regulations and
norms. Interestingly, the rules and norms about gender relations in
these places are often in many respects markedly diﬀerent from those in
the outside world. De Boeck, for instance, has noted that women in-
volved in the diamond trade between Angola’s Lunda Norte province
and the Congolese border towns of Kahemba and Tembo at the end of
the 1990s made ‘an attempt at adopting and manipulating essentially male
strategies, using alliances as a means to create a supporting network for
commercial and sometimes also political ends’ (1999: 107). In doing so,
they transformed local gender regimes, which is why they were locally
referred to as ‘dogs breaking their leash’ (ibidem: 93). Bryceson, Jonsson
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and Verbrugge have made similar observations with regard to women’s
experimentation with unconventional conjugal and sexual relationships
in Tanzanian gold mining settlements, pointing out that ‘women in
mining settlements tend to see themselves as liberated and modern, no longer
subject to male patriarchal control exerted by their rural home areas’
(Bryceson et al., 2013: 53).
Other scholars have warned, however, that there are limits to how
much female inhabitants of artisanal mining towns and camps can
transgress, deviate from, or change conventional gender norms.
Werthmann (2009), for example, has noted that, although many women
in Burkina Faso migrate to the gold mining camps in the hope of ob-
taining a greater degree of personal freedom and economic in-
dependence, the division of labor in these settings is largely in line with
the gender ideology in the rest of Burkinabe society. Likewise, in a book
chapter about the causes of small-scale gold mining conflicts in Sur-
iname, Heemskerk and Duijves (2013: 91), have reported cases of
women owning mining concessions and mining machines, but they
have also drawn attention to the absence of women in the mining pits –
a result of the fact that type of work is considered too physically de-
manding for them. A final example is Mususa’s (2010) ethnographic
account of how, between 2004 and 2008, many women in the Zambian
Copperbelt were trying to make ends meet by artisanally digging up
copper ores at so-called ‘dump sites’, which had been abandoned after
the privatization of Zambia’s national copper mining company in 1997.
Mususa’s analysis confirms that female participants in ASM are not
immune to gender-related discrimination and oppression.
The existing research on women’s involvement in ASM thus points
to two important patterns. First, there is the observation that, in many
mineral-rich parts of the Global South, women move to the mining
areas in the hope of finding new sources of income and experiencing a
higher level of freedom vis-à-vis oppressive gender rules and norms.
And second, it has also been remarked that, although women working
and living in artisanal and small-scale mining areas often develop
several strategies to increase their room for manoeuver, they continue
to experience multiple gendered forms of inequality, exclusion and
marginalization. A lot has already been written about the ways in which
women miners exercise agency in the complex and unstable socio-po-
litical environments of artisanal mining sites.
Far less is known, however, about the diﬀerences in agency and the
power relations between these women. Very little research has yet been
done on why some women are more successful than others in becoming
integrated in what is essentially still a male-dominated industry, in
dealing with the increasingly complicated regulatory and institutional
landscape of ASM, and in exploiting loopholes in the system.
Furthermore, there is also a lack of knowledge about the rivalry and
struggle for power between ‘big women’ jockeying for position and
competing for the same resources, and about the ways in which the
hierarchical diﬀerences between women occupying diﬀerent positions
and playing diﬀerent roles in the production process shape their ev-
eryday interaction in the workplace.
In this article, we want to address these gaps in the research by
presenting a case study on women’s involvement in the artisanal mining
business of Kisengo, a locality situated in the Nyunzu territory of the
Congolese Tanganyika province. Since 2007, Kisengo has been among
the largest coltan mines in Nyunzu territory. The coltan boom has led to
Kisengo’s transformation from a small village into a fast-growing urban
center and to the increased presence of military and non-military state
institutions, all hoping to benefit from the local mineral deposits.
Focusing our attention on the so-called mamans moutrousses, a group of
women assisting the artisanal miners with the drying and cleaning of
mineral ores, we will show that there are considerable diﬀerences in
how women miners navigate the unstable socio-political environment
of ASM in Kisengo as well as in the ways they exercise agency and
power in these diﬃcult circumstances.
The article is based on ethnographic fieldwork by the first author in
Kisengo in May and June 2014. Data were collected through a combi-
nation of participant observation, in-depth interviews with leading
figures in the mining community, and semi-structured interviews with
in individual women working as mamans moutrousses.
2. Making sense of diﬀerences in female agency in artisanal
mining settings
In ‘The practice of everyday life’ (1984), the French cultural theorist
Michel de Certeau made a distinction between “strategies” and “tac-
tics”. The former concept referred to the “calculation of power relation-
ships which becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor,
an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated from an ‘en-
vironment’” (1984: xix). De Certeau, drawing on the work of von
Clausewitz about war-making, argued that the powerful in society first
seek to occupy and delimit a place (a territory or an institution) as their
own, which they can then use as an operating base from where to
control and manage other groups through a range of disciplinary
techniques. It is this proper place that makes it possible to plan their
own actions regardless of the circumstances, but also to foresee and
anticipate on the actions of others. For their part, those who find
themselves in a subordinate position do not have such an autonomous
place, nor do they have the power to change or transform the conditions
in which they live. This does not mean, however, that they are com-
pletely passive or that they lack any kind of maneuvering space. Ac-
cording to de Certeau, the “weak” can rely on the use of “tactics”, which
means that they can take advantage of certain situations or circum-
stances to create opportunities for themselves. As Isachenko has aptly
summarized it, ‘this art of the weak consists (….) in manipulating the space
of the strong to turn circumstances into opportunities’ (Isachenko, 2012:
30).
De Certeau’s ideas about the dynamics of domination and resistance
bear strong similarities to those of James Scott. Instead of studying the
overt, direct forms of peasant resistance against laws, taxes, develop-
ment policies and various forms of exploitation in Malaysia, Scott
(1985) focused on what he called “everyday forms of resistance” such
as foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, gossip, and false compliance,
activities which do not require a lot of planning and coordination, and
which allow subordinate groups to express dissatisfaction with their
working and living conditions, without having to face the often painful
consequences of a direct confrontation with authority. Further elabor-
ating on this theme, Scott (1990) also highlighted the importance of
making a distinction between, on the one hand, the ‘public transcript’,
i.e. what powerholders and subordinate groups say and do in public,
and, on the other hand, the so-called ‘hidden transcripts’, the discourses
and actions that occur oﬀstage, in private conversations, informal
gatherings and meetings, outside what Foucault has called ‘the gaze of
power’. By paying close attention to the discrepancies between the
‘public transcript’ and the ‘hidden transcripts’, as well as to how ele-
ments of the latter sometimes come to the surface and enter the public
domain, researchers can gain a much deeper understanding of how
power inequalities are experienced, interpreted, evaluated and com-
mented on. Another reason for studying everyday forms of resistance is
that they often prove to be precursors to more organized and con-
frontational forms of resistance such as demonstrations, riots and re-
bellions (Kerkvliet, 2009: 233).
While de Certeau and Scott have been praised for their eﬀorts to
highlight and make sense of how individual social actors in subordinate
positions engage in various forms of everyday politics and resistance,
they have also been criticized for presenting an overly simplified and
reductionist picture of the dynamics of power relations. Critics have
argued that it is wrong to presuppose a dichotomous antagonism be-
tween dominating and oppressed groups, to assume that power in-
equalities are relatively stable and also fixed in space, and to believe
that there is only one dominant, coherent order in a given society.
M.-R. Bashwira and J. Cuvelier 7KH([WUDFWLYH,QGXVWULHVDQG6RFLHW\[[[[[[[[[[²[[[

Moreover, critics have also pointed out that, contrary to what de
Certeau and Scott seem to suggest, the agency of individuals in sub-
ordinate positions should not automatically be taken to be limited to
mere tactical maneuvering and the use of relatively harmless forms of
everyday resistance and ‘hidden transcripts’. In reality, the capacity of
people in inferior positions to actually change or transform the order(s)
with which they are confronted is often bigger than one would imagine
(Korf et al., 2010: 388; Gal, 1995).
Vigh tried to overcome the limits of the approach of de Certeau and
Scott by coining the concept of ‘social navigation’. With this analytical
construct, he sought to capture ‘the way in which agents seek to draw and
actualize their life trajectories in order to increase their social possibilities
and life chances in a shifting and volatile social environment (2006:11)’.
Vigh compared the eﬀorts of militia members in Guinea Bissau to carve
out a path for themselves, despite the many uncertainties associated
with living in a civil war context, with the strains of sailors trying to
move their boat across troubled waters. Just like sailors need to pay
attention to oncoming waves, while at the same time steering for a
distant point in or beyond the horizon, the young men in Vigh’s eth-
nography have to navigate the highly unstable and unpredictable socio-
political landscape in Guinea-Buissau. While doing their best to keep
afloat and to reach a self-chosen point of destination, they take into
account both their current position and possibilities as well as the ones
they imagine to have in the future. The concept of ‘social navigation’
thus allows to illuminate social agents’ awareness of their present-day
positions and opportunities, but also their realization that they may find
themselves repositioned one day due to changing circumstances.
Adding a spatial dimension to the analysis of the agency of people
living in volatile socio-political environments, Korf et al. (2010) in-
troduced the notion of ‘governable orders’, which ‘sediment into a spe-
cific hierarchy of rules and authoritative powers, varying at diﬀerent mo-
ments in time in a given place and in diﬀerent places at the same moment in
time (2010: 389–390). According to Korf et al., it makes sense to re-
define Michael Watts’ notion of ‘governable space’ as the spatial con-
figuration of diﬀerent, overlapping ‘governable orders’ in a specific
time and place. Research first needs to explore and reveal how the
orders and their underlying logics become eﬀective in a specific place,
time, and social condition. Subsequently, it is also important to look at
how social actors “navigate” this complex environment.
Although the approach proposed by Korf et al. constitutes a sig-
nificant step forward in the analysis of people’s agency in unstable
socio-political contexts, there is one thing that, in our opinion, merits
more analytical attention: the gendered nature of social navigation. We
believe it is important to pay attention to the fact that men and women
are diﬀerently positioned towards, diﬀerently aﬀected by, and, in cer-
tain respects, also diﬀerently responsive to the wide variety of chal-
lenges and diﬃculties they encounter while living and working in such
contexts. Due to the existence of oppressive gender ideologies and
structural gender inequalities in the division of labor and the access to
resources, livelihoods, public services and positions of authority,
amongst other things, women generally have a much more diﬃcult
time keeping afloat. Consequently, their navigation styles can also be
expected to be (partly) gender-specific (Benya, 2016). Since women’s
room for manoeuver is usually much more restricted than that of their
male counterparts, they are likely to draw on diﬀerent repertoires of
coping mechanisms and survival skills, and to use diﬀerent practical
and discursive strategies to achieve their goals and protect their inter-
ests (see e.g. Utas, 2005). Of course, several decades of feminist inter-
sectional research have taught us to also pay attention to intra-gender
diﬀerences (Yuval-Davis, 2006). People’s design and use of navigation
styles is not only shaped by gender, but also by other factors such as
class, age, religion and race.
In the following sections, we will use the abovementioned insights
and concepts to analyze the diﬀerences in agency between diﬀerently
positioned women in Kisengo’s world of artisanal mining. We will show
that the 3 places where mining and mining-related activities occur - the
mining sites, the town of Kisengo and the mining camps - can be con-
sidered as ‘governable spaces’, in which 4, partly overlapping ‘gov-
ernable orders’ can be observed: (i) the order of chieftainship, (ii) the
military order, (iii) the order of the state administration, and (iv) the
order of international mining capitalism. We will explain how the
configuration of ‘governable orders’ in the above-mentioned ‘govern-
able spaces’ has changed over time, and how female participants in
artisanal mining have tried to maintain a degree of control over their
activities despite these changing circumstances. The analysis will fur-
ther demonstrate that women’s navigation styles, in other words, the
ways in which they adapt to and come to grips with changes in the
regulatory landscape, as well as the manner in which they engage in
various forms of everyday resistance against the threat of margin-
alization and exclusion, are profoundly gendered. In addition to this,
we will also show that some women have been more successful navi-
gators than others. Following Honwana (2000), who has drawn in-
spiration from the work of de Certeau, one could argue that the less
successful women in Kisengo’s mining business have only been able to
display ‘tactic agency’, while the more successful ones have succeeded
in demonstrated ‘strategic agency’.
3. Women navigating the changing institutional and regulatory
landscape of artisanal mining in Kisengo
The northern part of Katanga, where Kisengo is located, has always
been a predominantly agricultural and somewhat isolated and under-
developed area. People living in the resource-rich southern part of
Katanga sometimes mockingly refer to northern Katanga as ‘useless
Katanga’ (Katanga inutile). It is estimated that more than three quarters
of the population in the region secure their daily survival through
agriculture and fishing, with hunting and gathering constituting com-
plementary subsistence activities (Omasombo, 2015: 315).
Nevertheless, since 2007, mining has become increasingly im-
portant in Northern Katanga. Three quarters of available land in the
province of Tanganyika1 is currently covered by carrés miniers, which
means that mining operators holding exploration and/or exploitation
rights over these areas have the possibility of evicting the people living
and working there. The rapid expansion of the mining sector has also
led to a significant decline in the available labor force in the agri-
cultural sector (Omasombo, 2015).
In Kisengo, which is part of the Nyunzu territory, the artisanal ex-
traction and sale of coltan, a precious mineral ore which is of vital
importance of electronic devices, started in March 2007. Since then, the
town has acquired the reputation of being the most important coltan
mining and trading center in the area. Due to the influx of large num-
bers of artisanal miners, the place changed from a small village into a
rapidly growing urban center, a transformation that went hand in hand
with the increased presence of military and non-military state institu-
tions (Cuvelier and Bashwira, 2016: 3).
Although Kisengo’s artisanal mining population has been largely
made up of men, women have also been involved in a wide variety of
mining and mining-related activities. In what follows, we will focus our
attention on the so-called mamans moutrousses (or moutrousses in short),
a group of women specialized in the reprocessing of coltan mineral
tailings. After minerals have been extracted in one of Kisengo’s mines,
the teams of artisanal miners take them to a selling point (point d’achat).
There, the mamans moutrousses light a fire, where the minerals can be
dried on an iron plate, in a place called mafiga.2 Women usually work in
2–3 people per mafiga. When dry, the minerals are cleaned: the tailings
are removed and put aside by the mamans moutrousses for reprocessing
1 Tanganyika is a former district of Katanga, which was split into 4 new
provinces in July 2015 as part of Congo’s decentralization process.
2Mafiga is the Swahili word for cooking stones (sing.: figa), which are used to
support a pot in a traditional kitchen.
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purposes. The dry minerals are handed over to the artisanal miners who
can then take them to a mineral buyer for sale.3
Before we explain how the moutrousses adapted to changing mining
regulations and governance arrangements, and – most importantly –
how they competed for dominance between themselves, we will first
give an overview of the institutional and regulatory landscape in
Kisengo. As Vogel (2018) has recently shown, public authority in the
context of governing ASM has become increasingly fragmented and
contested between customary leaders, state and non-state armed
groups, state administration and businessmen.
3.1. The coexistence of multiple governable orders in Kisengo
3.1.1. The order of chieftainship
In the early days of the coltan boom, the most important governable
order that could be observed in the mining sites, the mining camp, and
the center of Kisengo was that of the customary chief. The remarkably
prominent role of chiefs in Congo’s mining sector can be attributed to
the fact that they are seen as representatives of the ancestors, with
whom they are believed to entertain a privileged collaborative re-
lationship (Smith, 2018). As (self-declared) guarantors of ancestral
control over natural resources, chiefs are treated with a combination of
suspicion and respect by the artisanal mining population, who believe
they depend on them for personal safety and a good production.
Similarly to what can be observed in other resource-rich countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa, Congolese customary authorities have displayed a
strong capacity ‘to mobilize the customary as a fungible political resource in
order to control flows of wealth in tangible assets, territory and people’
(Comaroﬀ and Comaroﬀ, 2018: 19). Chiefs have been very successful in
using tradition as political capital, because, historically speaking, they
have always exerted a great deal of control over land and labor (see Van
Acker, 2005), and also because they have managed to use their his-
torical roles in the bureaucratic apparatus of the state to control peo-
ple’s access to state services. In rural, relatively isolated places like
Kisengo, where the presence of the Congolese state is even weaker than
elsewhere in the country, the customary chief has, for a very long time,
served as the main point of contact for all state-related aﬀairs. In April
2009, the District Commissioner of Tanganyika promoted the village
chief of Kisengo to the rank of chef de groupement, which is the second
highest rank in the Congolese administration (Iguma and Hilhorst,
2017: 90).
3.1.2. The military order
The second governable order that we have been able to identify in
our research on Kisengo is the military order. During the Second Congo
War, which erupted in August 1998 and pitted the late Kabila regime
against its former regional allies of Rwanda and Uganda, northern
Katanga was strategically very important, a fact that led to the region’s
gradual militarization. President Laurent-Désiré Kabila wanted to pre-
vent the Rwandans from reaching the military base of Kamina and the
Katangese capital of Lubumbashi. He also wanted to avoid becoming
isolated from his home area of Manono and being cut oﬀ from the
Copperbelt in the South. To prevent such a scenario from happening,
orders were given to create various armed groups, which received
military assistance from the Kinshasa government in the form of am-
munition and light weapons. Because, after the oﬃcial end of the
second Congolese war, these armed groups were never fully integrated
into the oﬃcial security forces, the Forces Armées de la République
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), they became a real threat to the po-
pulation of northern Katanga from 2002 onwards (International Crisis
Group, 2006: 2-4).
At the end of 2007, approximately 200 FARDC soldiers were present
at the coltan mines of Northern Katanga, including mostly non-in-
tegrated elements from the 69th FARDC brigade based in Kongolo. This
latter brigade was composed of both soldiers who were loyal to the
government in Kinshasa and former members of the rebel movements
RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie) and MLC (Mouvement
pour la Libération du Congo) (de Koning, 2010: 11). In 2008, it was re-
ported that these soldiers refused to move back to their barracks, de-
spite calls to do so by their superiors in Lubumbashi. The reason was
that they preferred to continue extorting money from artisanal miners
and traders (de Koning, 2012: 239).
According to Ruben de Koning, who did fieldwork in the mining
areas of Northern Katanga in 2009, the military exploitation of the
mining communities took various forms, ranging from robbery at
gunpoint, over the imposition of illicit fees and taxes, the creation of
temporary roadblocks, and brief visits to the mines to demand cash,
goods or minerals, to forms of coercive governance in the mining areas.
Soldiers from the Kongolo brigade obtained the monopoly on the use of
violence in and around the areas of extraction, oﬀered protection to
groups of miners, and claimed a considerable share of the production as
a reward for their services (de Koning, 2010; see also Garrett et al.,
2009 and, more generally about military-civilian relationships in
eastern and southeastern DRC, Verweijen, 2015). At the time of field-
work by the first author, though, these forms of harassment by the
FARDC appeared to have come to an end in the Kisengo area.
3.1.3. The order of the state administration
The third governable order in Kisengo is that of the state adminis-
tration. Despite the fact that Congo is often cited as a prototypical ex-
ample of a weak state, state institutions have nevertheless survived,
even in remote places like Kisengo. According to Englebert, this is in
large part due to the fact that, despite its obvious disadvantages in
terms of poor service delivery, the weakness of the Congolese state has
also created a number of advantages for state elites, public servants and
ordinary citizens. While members of the elite have used the weak state
as an instrument of predation, using their ‘parcels of state authority’ to
extract resources from the population, public servants have continued
to attend to their daily jobs in the administration, either to safeguard
their meagre salaries or to support their claims to the future payment of
their salaries. For their part, ordinary citizens have accepted the per-
sistence of state institutions because it provides them with ‘a minimum
level of certainty about public life, the opportunity to form relatively stable
expectations about where power and resources lie, and a modicum of re-
duction of transaction costs as they go about their lives’ (Englebert, 2003:
9).
In the Congolese artisanal and small-scale mining sector, SAESS-
CAM (Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small-Scale Mining)4 is one
of the most important state institutions. According to its oﬃcial man-
date, it is expected to provide technical and financial assistance to ar-
tisanal miners. Furthermore, it is also supposed to channel production
from artisanal mining operations into oﬃcial channels so as to combat
fraud and maximize state revenues. Practically speaking, this comprises
a long list of tasks, including improving the working conditions and
productivity of artisanal miners, stimulating them to comply with the
Congolese mining code, encouraging the creation of mining co-
operatives, participating in the establishment of credit sources for ar-
tisanal miners, monitoring mineral flows, and, finally, the collection of
taxes (Geenen and Radley, 2014: 63).
There is, however, an enormous discrepancy between SAESSCAM’s
oﬃcial mandate and the practices of its employees on the ground. In
fact, all agencies and technical services within the Ministry of Mines in
eastern DRC are faced with the same structural challenges. Under-
3 Mineral buyers also make use of the services of the mamans moutrousses
when they want to have their minerals cleaned a second time.
4 The name of SAESSCAM has recently been changed into SAEMAP (Service
d’Assistance et d’Encadrement de l’Exploitation Minière en Petite Echelle en
République Démocratique du Congo).
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resourced and under-paid, they experience great diﬃculties to fulfill
their mandates in an appropriate manner. Not only do they often lack
the logistical capacity to cover the distances between diﬀerent mining
sites, they also suﬀer from a lack of technical capacity to be able to do
their work once they are there. In order to make up for this lack of
means, public servants working for these services frequently resort to
alternative income-generating strategies such as extortion or theft
(Rothenberg and Radley, 2014: 21, cited in Vogel, 2018: 77-78).
Another important state institution in Congo’s world of ASM is the
Division des Mines (Mining Division), which holds the responsibility for
inspecting mining activities at the level of the mine pits. While the
geological department of the Division des Mines is tasked with doing
geological studies, other departments take care of the administration of
mineral flows, the collection of production statistics, and the author-
ization of mineral evacuation and export. Following the introduction of
traceability mechanisms in the ASM sector as part of the international
campaign against conflict minerals (see below: 3.1.4), the Division des
Mines has also become actively involved in registering the mineral trade
and tagging mineral bags at the level of the mineral depots (Diemel,
2018: 12, footnote 24).
In July 2007, both SAESSCAM and the Division des Mines opened a
local oﬃce in Kisengo. As will become clear in the rest of the article, the
two services started collecting taxes from the artisanal miners without
delivering receipts. This resulted in the taxes being perceived as illegal
by the artisanal mining population (Iguma and Hilhorst, 2017: 90).
3.1.4. The order of international mining capitalism
The fourth and final governable order that we distinguish in this
article, the order of international mining capitalism, is closely entwined
with the campaign against so-called conflict minerals. As we have ex-
plained in greater detail elsewhere (see Cuvelier et al., 2014), the illegal
exploitation of minerals such as gold, diamonds, tin, tantalum and
tungsten is considered as one of the principle causes of the continuation
of armed conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. In order to break this supposedly direct link between resource
extraction and violent conflict, a wide range of measures have been
taken with the aim of preventing conflict minerals from entering the
international markets, and increasing the transparency of the Congolese
artisanal mining sector.
One of the most important measures is the International Tin
Research Institute’s Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi), a traceability me-
chanism for tin, tantalum, and tungsten, the so-called 3 T minerals. The
mechanism makes it possible to trace individual ore shipments back to
their point of origin through a ‘bag and tag’ process with bar-coded tags
serving as tracking tools. At every point in the supply chain, data are
collected and introduced into the database, while audits of the iTSCi
program and its participants are undertaken on an annual basis to in
order to ensure transparency and reliability (Cuvelier et al., 2014: 4-5).
The implementation of traceability mechanisms such as iTSCi can be
interpreted as an attempt to ward oﬀ the dangers of reputational da-
mage for international buyers of Congolese 3 T minerals (see also Hilson
et al., 2018a for a similar situation in the gold sector). At the same time,
however, measures like these can also be seen as part of a process of
capitalist frontier enclosure, whereby one mining site after the other is
integrated into an internationally recognized system of mineral trading
with limited government intervention (Vogel and Raeymaekers, 2016).
The Indian company Mining Mineral Resources (MMR) has played a
prominent role in expanding the capitalist frontier into the rural areas
of Northern Katanga. The company was not only instrumental in kick-
starting the iTSCi project in Katanga in 2011, but also oﬀered financial
assistance to allow government services in the ASM sector to continue
operating. In February 2010, MMR signed a contract with the provincial
branch of the national police force (PNC), committing itself to the
monthly payment of a fixed amount of money to each oﬃcer of the
PNC. In addition to this, MMR also stepped in when the Congolese state
failed to pay the salaries of these police oﬃcers in time. At least until
July 2011, it pre-financed these salaries in times of emergency. SAES-
SCAM also received support from MMR in the form of food and ac-
commodation for inspectors working in 3 T mining areas controlled by
MMR. The inspectors also received a “motivation premium” (prime de
motivation) at the end of each month (Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015).
MMR worked closely together with the mining cooperative CDMC
(Coopérative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo), which was not a bottom-
up organization representing and defending the interests of artisanal
miners and mineral buyers, but a typical example of an organization
initiated and led by elite members at the provincial level. Created in
Lubumbashi on 10 April 2010, it was run by “big men” based in
Kinshasa and in the big mining towns of Katanga (Iguma and Hilhorst,
2017).
The arrival of MMR in Kisengo was coupled with a progressive
formalization of the mining process. First of all, there was a division of
the mining areas into sectors, subsectors and shafts, which were con-
trolled and managed by 2–5 chefs de site and gardes de site appointed by
the mining cooperative CDMC. Second, MMR also created checkpoints
that needed to be crossed by those wanting to reach the sectors. Third,
the company created diﬀerent categories of miners, distributing mining
cards (cartes de creuseurs) through the CDMC. Fourth, plots of land (of
10–20 square meters) were now distributed by SAESSCAM’s supervising
staﬀ (encadreurs). Fifth and finally, the supply chain was streamlined,
with a strict division of labor and follow-up of activities at each step of
the mining process (Iguma and Hilhorst, 2017: 92-93).
From the preceding account, it is clear that the institutional and
regulatory landscape in Kisengo was characterized by the coexistence of
4 ‘governable orders’: the order of chieftainship, the military order, the
order of the state administration, and the order of international mining
capitalism. These 4 orders could be observed in 3 ‘governable spaces’:
the town of Kisengo, the mining sites, and the mining camps, albeit with
diﬀerent degrees of influence on the behavior of social actors in each of
these spaces. In the following sections, we will have a closer look at
how female participants in artisanal mining have navigated this highly
complex environment. Particular attention will be paid to the gendered
navigation styles of two ‘big women’ in Kisengo: Dorothée and Marie-
José5 .
3.2. Gendered navigation styles
3.2.1. In the shadow of the chief
The first protagonist in the story below is Dorothée. She is the niece
of the customary chief of Kisengo and was appointed by the latter as the
president of the mères-cheﬀes (literally: “mother-chiefs”) in 2007. In the
period before the arrival of the Indian mining company MMR (cfr.
supra), the mère-cheﬀes held key leadership positions in Kisengo’s
mining camps. Together with the male camp chiefs (chefs de camp), who
supervised the male artisanal miners in the camp and who also be-
longed to the customary chief’s family, the mères-cheﬀes were part of
the customary governance structure in the early days of the coltan
boom. Both the chefs de camp and the mères-cheﬀes were of vital im-
portance for ensuring the continuing dominance of chiefly authority in
Kisengo.
The mères-cheﬀes held several responsibilities in the mining camps.
First of all, they were responsible for taking care of administrative
guests and newcomers. This included cleaning their houses, bringing
water for their showers and making sure they were at ease in the camp.
Second, they provided counsel on all problems regarding gender issues
and played a mediating role in disputes between husbands and wives in
the camp. The mère-cheﬀes also managed the sex workers living and
working in the camp. The latter were expected to come to them to
register upon arrival, and received several things in return. Registration
5 For security reasons, the real names of the two protagonists have been re-
placed by pseudonyms.
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gave them security in the event of a problem (e.g. with a client or with
the administration), and allowed them to become part of a kind of fa-
mily. Being registered under the mères-cheﬀes made it possible for them
to benefit from medical support donated by certain NGOs and some-
times from the free-of-charge distribution of condoms. The money these
women earned was given to the mères-cheﬀes, who were in charge of all
the expenses and needs for each woman until they decided to leave the
camps.
In addition to being the president of the mères-cheﬀes, Dorothée
acted as the manager of the moutrousses, listening to and trying to solve
their everyday problems. In 2007, the customary chief of Kisengo in-
structed Dorothée to collect the customary tribute (redevance) among
the female economic operators in town (i.e. the sex workers, traders and
moutrousses), allowing her to keep part of the money for herself.
Of course, it was not a coincidence that Dorothée was entrusted
with this particular set of responsibilities, and that she expected to play
the role of a caring, welcoming and counseling mother. As Schatzberg
has pointed out in a book on political legitimacy in middle Africa,
women’s roles in the political arena are based on an idealized con-
ception of their roles within the family. They are supposed to comple-
ment and support male powerholders (who act and present themselves
as father-figures) and to limit themselves largely to the roles of coun-
selors and advisors (2001: 184). In line with the dominant patriarchal
gender ideology in Congolese society, Dorothée’s involvement in cus-
tomary politics was restricted to assisting the chief in controlling the
local economy and keeping an eye on female economic operators on his
behalf. Still, she did exploit her limited maneuvering space to the full.
Presenting herself as a real ‘big woman’, she developed an extensive
network of reciprocal relationships with her followers, providing them
with medical, emotional and financial care and expecting their loyalty
in return.
3.2.2. From prima inter pares to leader of the pack
The second protagonist in our story, who would grow out to become
Dorothée’s principle rival, is Marie-José. Having previously worked as a
trader in the mining sector, Marie-José enjoyed the status of a pioneer
in the moutrousse community. She was among the first to do the work of
moutrousse and initiated many others in the profession. Shortly after the
arrival of MMR in Kisengo, Marie-José was contacted by the company
to become the “manager” of the moutrousses. In that capacity, she would
be responsible for collecting, bagging and tagging the minerals that
women wanted to sell from the mine as part of the requirements as-
sociated with the iTSCi traceability mechanism (see 3.1.4). Similar to
the way Dorothée was used by Kisengo’s customary chief to safeguard
and consolidate chiefly authority in the early days of the coltan boom,
and to ensure women’s compliance with it, Marie-José was used by
MMR to facilitate the entry of a new governable order in Kisengo: the
order of international mining capitalism.
It should be noted that, at the beginning of the implementation of
the iTSCi program in Kisengo, the status of women in the mining pro-
cess was unclear. Despite the fact that both MMR and the mining co-
operative CDMC accepted mineral selling by women after the re-
processing phase, they did not yet formally recognize them as a full-
fledged group of actors in the mineral supply chain. It was not until
2013, when the female head of the Division des Mines approached Marie-
José to formalize the position of the moutrousses, that a solution for this
problem was found, albeit a rather unconventional one. In fact, it was
proposed that the moutrousses would be given identification cards
(cartes de creuseurs or diggers cards) so that they would have formal
access to the mining economy as diggers, despite the fact that they
never engaged in any digging activities.
By 2014, when the fieldwork for this article was carried out, 35
identification cards had already been distributed among the mou-
trousses, and each of these women was hiring other women to help
them, usually people who lacked the necessary money to buy cards of
their own. The group of helpers were collectively known as “sous-
couverts” (literally: women working undercover). The word ‘sous-cou-
vert’ is a generic term referring to any person helping his ‘boss’ by
covering his/her absence. The system is based on a personal and verbal
agreement between the mineral buyer and his assistant and is not
supposed to be known by the cooperative, the industry or iTSCi agents.
This is because it is perceived as a violation of one of the key ethical
principles in contemporary extractive industries: that every single
participant in the supply chain has to be oﬃcially known, registered
and recognized so as to guarantee absolute transparency about the
origin of the minerals and the conditions under which they have been
mined.
The creative solution for the formalization of the involvement of the
mamans moutrousses in the mineral supply chain, put forward by a fe-
male local bureaucrat, constitutes a good example of what Olivier de
Sardan (2015) has called ‘practical norms’, that is, ‘the various informal,
de facto, tacit or latent norms that underlie the practices of actors which
diverge from the oﬃcial norms’. On the one hand, there is a dissonance
between the formal rules for ASM in the DRC and the real practices of
public servants in the Kisengo branch of the Division des Mines. On the
other hand, however, the practical arrangements between these ‘street
level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980) and the moutrousses are also evidently
driven by a commitment to save the spirit of supply chain transparency
under diﬃcult conditions. Consequently, it seems appropriate to de-
scribe these ‘practical norms’ as ‘palliative’ (Olivier de Sardan, 2015).
The distribution of mining cards among the mamans moutrousses does
not appear to have been an act of resistance against the order of in-
ternational mining capitalism, but rather an attempt to make the system
work and to humanize bureaucratic relations.
It needs to be emphasized that the eﬀects of this attempt to for-
malize the position of the mamans moutrousses in the mineral supply
chain were not equally positive for all women involved in this activity.
As already indicated above, women lacking the necessary financial re-
sources to buy a mining card of their own were forced to become ‘sous-
couverts’, in other words, the subordinates of one of the wealthier, and
hence more powerful, female card-holders. What happened in Kisengo
was thus in many ways similar to the process described by Fisher
(2007) in her analysis of the Tanzanian artisanal mining sector in the
early 2000s. Fisher notes that the integration of artisanal miners into
formal institutional, regulatory and legal structures is usually seen as a
positive thing, since it is assumed to strengthen these people’s capacity
to claim and defend their rights as well as to facilitate their access to
credit opportunities. In practice, however, these eﬀorts to integrate
previously excluded and marginalized economic actors into the formal
economy often tend to neglect existing power diﬀerences and social
inequalities. As a result, Fisher points out, the integration eﬀorts only
benefit a small elite of relatively wealthy people, while they lead to
socio-economic independence, exploitation and insecurity for others
(Fisher, 2007: 735).
3.2.3. Two big women jockeying for position
The rise of Marie-José, the second ‘big woman’ in Kisengo’s artisanal
mining business, gave rise to multiple clashes with Dorothée over the
control of the network of the mamans moutrousses. In fact, due to the
frequency of contact between Marie-José and the Division des Mines, the
importance of Marie-José’s position increased, and this was perceived
as a threat by Dorothée. To counterbalance Marie-José’s growing po-
sition, Dorothée turned to the new chief of the Kisengo branch of
SAESSCAM. She informed him that all the money was now being taken
by the Division des Mines, to the disadvantage of SAESSCAM. To
Dorothée’s mind, SAESSCAM (as being concerned with the technical
support of the artisanal miners) should be the department dealing with
the diggers’ taxes and should not let the Division des Mines get all of the
money. In talking to SAESSCAM, Dorothée added that they could give
one share of the collected tax money to the territory administrator and
another share to the customary chief, in order to gain both of the latter’s
support.
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Seeing how the situation was quickly escalating between Dorothée
and Marie-José, and how it negatively aﬀected the production of the
moutrousses as well as the functioning of the public services (SAESSCAM
and Division des Mines), the Comité Local de Suivi (local stakeholder
consultation committee) eventually scheduled a meeting to settle the
dispute6 .
3.2.4. Tactical agency versus strategic agency
From the preceding account, it is clear that the institutional and reg-
ulatory landscape in Kisengo has been characterized by the coexistence of
multiple governable orders. Moreover, due to the fact that diﬀerent orders
have been dominant at diﬀerent places and at diﬀerent points in time, the
governance situation has also been very fluid. The combination of these
two factors has required strong navigation skills and a high degree of
adaptability on the part of the moutrousses. One example will suﬃce to
illustrate this. Before the introduction of the governable order of interna-
tional mining capitalism, women were allowed access to the mine, which
gave them to opportunity to negotiate directly with the artisanal miners
and to strike better deals with them. The reason for this was that, at that
time, the order of the state administration and the order of chieftainship
were still dominant in the space of the mine. Both the customary chief and
members of his inner circle accepted the presence of women in the mine,
and the same held true for those in charge of the local administration. As a
result of the mining reforms, however, the order of international mining
capitalism became dominant in the space of the mine, but also in spaces
earmarked for the buying and selling of minerals. From then onwards,
women were no longer granted access to these two spaces. Their room for
maneuver changed rather drastically, and there were much more restric-
tions with regard to their participation in the commodity chain. To adapt
themselves to these new circumstances, the moutrousses forged alliances
with strategically positioned actors, responsible for overlooking and
monitoring people’s compliance with the rules of the order of international
mining capitalism. Thanks to these alliances, the moutrousses found ways
to circumvent the restrictions on their participation in the mining process.
As a group, they have thus succeeded in maintaining a certain degree of
agency and control over their working conditions, despite being con-
fronted with constant changes in the configuration of governable orders
and despite having to operate in a male-dominated environment.
That being said, it is important to emphasize that, within the group
of moutrousses, there has been considerable variation in the extent to
which individual women have managed to navigate the complexities of
their living and working environment. Roughly speaking, there is a
continuum, with at the one end, less successful navigators, who have
only been able to engage in ‘tactical agency’, and, at the other end,
more successful navigators, who have been able to demonstrate ‘stra-
tegic agency’ (see Honwana, 2000). In the first group, we find the so-
called ‘sous-couverts’: women who, for a variety of reasons, have lacked
the necessary financial means to become independent card-holders and
who have therefore been forced to work at the service of a wealthier
and better connected female colleague. The agency of these ‘sous-cou-
verts’ is best described as tactic, according to the meaning given to it by
de Certeau. While ‘sous-couverts’ exploit loopholes in the system and
demonstrate their capacity to cope with the immediate challenges in
their working and living environment (cfr. the use of artisanal mining
cards to escape the restrictions on access following the entry of MMR
and the formalization process), they never do so on their own initiative.
The reason for this is that they do not have a power base of their own:
they have no recognized position of authority in one of the governable
orders, no closeness to an established leader, and no economic success
that would allow them to build up financial and social capital and in-
fluence decision-making. As a result, the ‘sous-couverts’ can only beat
the system with the help of other, more powerful allies, who can take
them under their wings.
This brings us to the other end of the spectrum: the group of ‘big
women’ like Dorothée and Marie-José. As we have seen, Dorothée and
Marie-José have both succeeded in manifesting themselves as successful
navigators, because, unlike the ‘sous-couverts’, they do have their own
power base. While Dorothée has been able to capitalize on her closeness
to the customary chief and her oﬃcial position in the customary gov-
ernance structure, Marie-José has managed to draw advantage from her
economic success, her status as a pioneer within the moutrousse com-
munity, and her closeness to MMR and the Division des Mines. In a re-
markable display of ‘strategic agency’, Dorothée and Marie-José have
demonstrated their ability to assess the long-term consequences of their
actions by concluding partnerships with male powerholders and taking
advantage of the competition between diﬀerent state services in
Kisengo’s artisanal mining sector.
4. Conclusions
The aim of this article was to examine diﬀerences in agency and
power between women involved in artisanal mining activities in the
DRC. Through a case study on the mamans moutrousses in Kisengo, a
mining boomtown situated in the Congolese Tanganyika province, we
wanted to contribute to a better understanding of how and why some
women are more successful than others in navigating the complex - and
constantly changing - institutional and regulatory environments of ar-
tisanal mining settings. Our analysis has shown that, in order to make
sense of how people living and working in unstable socio-political
contexts try to maintain a certain degree of control over their lives, it is
helpful to combine Vigh’s navigation theory with a spatial approach
inspired by the insights of Watts (2004) and Korf et al. (2010). The use
of this theoretical framework has allowed us to draw attention to the
coexistence of multiple governable orders in artisanal mining areas, as
well as to the need to distinguish between diﬀerent governable spaces
in these areas. Moreover, the framework has also made it possible to
highlight the changing nature of the spatial configuration of governable
orders, and to produce a more fine-grained analysis of how individual
actors adapt and respond to such changes.
A second general finding of our study is that the navigation styles of
people operating in Congolese artisanal mining settings are gendered. Of
course, there are similarities between the navigation styles of women
miners and those of men. Apart from the fact that members of both groups
are known to enter into clientelistic relationships with the aim of enjoying
protection and support from their patrons, they both conclude alliances
with powerful, influential actors in order to be able to circumvent or
violate certain rules, and to work out what Olivier de Sardan (2015) has
referred to as ‘practical norms’ (Geenen, 2015), and they both capitalize on
the rivalry between diﬀerent state services and the lack of clarity about
their respective areas of competence (Diemel, 2018). Nevertheless, there
are also significant diﬀerences. First of all, the moutrousses have used
diﬀerent ‘repertoires of contention’ (Tilly, 1986; Tarrow, 1993), i.e. dif-
ferent ways of making claims on decision-makers. In their struggle to be
included in the formalization of 3 T mining, they have relied mainly on
informal lobbying, thus refraining from voicing their claims and demands
publicly through petitions, protest marches and other more visible stra-
tegies of claim-making, which are more frequently used by male partici-
pants in ASM activities (Iguma and Hilhorst, 2017). Second, women’s
navigation styles have been shaped by gendered solidarity. Despite being
rivals, both Dorothée and Marie-José have both made eﬀorts to secure the
continuation of the activities of the moutrousses and to shield them from
male interference. While the moutrousses have been obliged to adapt and
subject themselves to the order of chieftainship, for instance, their inter-
actions with this order have been mediated by the figure of themère-cheﬀe,
6 The CLS is a local committee comprising a representative of the Ministry of
Mines at the local level, as well as representatives from the artisanal miners, the
mineral traders, the local authorities, and the legitimate security actors. The
oﬃcial aim of this committee is to make sure that international due diligence
requirements are met and that the economic performance of the mining sector
is improved.
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who has acted as a kind of go-between or broker with the men forming the
inner circle of the customary chief. Acting in accordance with local norms
concerning the relationship between gender and power, the mère-cheﬀe
has played the role of a caring mother, who, on the one hand, has helped
to implement the rules of the father-chief, but, on the other hand, has also
made sure to protect her “children” from certain forms of abuse and ex-
ploitation, and who has supported them financially and emotionally in
times of need. Likewise, Marie-José has used her contacts with the Division
des Mines to work out a practical solution for the formalization of the
involvement of the moutrousses in the mineral supply chain.
Our third general finding is that there are considerable diﬀerences
between women miners as for the capacity to navigate the complex and
unstable socio-political environments of artisanal mining settings. We
have shown that there is a continuum with, on the one hand, successful
navigators like Dorothée and Marie-José who have the capacity to de-
monstrate ‘strategic agency’ thanks to their social, symbolic and fi-
nancial capital, and on the other hand, less successful navigators who
are only able to engage in ‘tactic agency’ due to the fact that they lack
the necessary financial means and connections to be able to take their
fate into their own hands.
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